Cognitive Neuroscience Meets the Philosophy of Mind
Neutral states of mind are systematically underrepresented in both contemporary philosophical theories and cognitive neuroscience. This is surprising because it often happens that people withhold judgment—perhaps because they lack sufficient knowledge, because they want to be cautious, or because they consider matters to be undecidable. The current neglect of these various neutral attitudes stems from an attempt to reduce the complexity of decision-making models, which in experimental approaches often leads to neutral decisions being interpreted as errors or actively suppressed through “forced choice” procedures. This project is an attempt to restore this lost complexity and to gain a more naturalistic understanding of decision-making, one in which it is possible to be decidedly undecided. We begin with a philosophical outline of the various types of cognitive neutrality, translate these into empirically assessable parameters, and, on this basis, develop new methods for the empirical investigation of different types of neutrality. In doing so, we focus on two central contexts of human decision-making: perception and cooperation. The theoretical and empirical findings are intended to prompt a reevaluation of established neurocognitive and philosophical theories.